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Prenatal diagnosis and abortion for congenital 
abnormalities: is it ethical to provide one without the 
other? 
Ballantyne, A. Newson, A.J., Luna, F. Ashcroft, R. (2009) 
This target article considers the ethical implications of providing prenatal diagnosis (PND) and 
antenatal screening services to detect fetal abnormalities in jurisdictions that prohibit abortion for 
these conditions. This unusual health policy context is common in the Latin American region. 
Congenital conditions are often untreated or under-treated in developing countries due to limited 
health resources, leading many women/couples to prefer termination of affected pregnancies. Three 
potential harms derive from the provision of PND in the absence of legal and safe abortion for these 
conditions: psychological distress, unjust distribution of burdens between socio-economic classes, 
and financial burdens for families and society. We present Iran as a comparative case study where 
recognition of these ethical issues has led to the liberalization of abortion laws for fetuses with 
thalassemia. We argue that physicians, geneticists and policymakers have an ethical and professional 
duty of care to advocate for change in order to ameliorate these harms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid 1990's, the provision of medical genetic services in Latin American countries such as 
Mexico, Argentina and Brazil has increased significantly. The provision of these services in public 
hospitals, university teaching hospitals and private clinics includes widespread access to prenatal 
diagnosis and antenatal screening (hereinafter PND) for the detection of fetal abnormalities. For 
example, molecular genetics is used regularly in large hospitals in Mexico for the diagnosis of 
common genetic conditions such as cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, and muscular dystrophy 
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(Penchaszadeh and Beiguelman 1998). Increasing access to such services in Latin America gives rise 
to an unusual health policy context in which fetal abnormalities are detected but parents do not 
have access to safe and legal abortion should they wish to terminate an affected pregnancy. This 
context has previously been critiqued as giving rise to a ‘therapeutic gap’ (Simpson, 2007). In this 
paper we argue that the juxtaposition of accessible PND and restrictive abortion law raises serious 
questions about the moral, social and psychological consequences for women and couples who are 
informed of a serious congenital abnormality, but who have no legal mechanisms to procure a 
termination. Genetic technologies are not neutral and the relationship between PND and abortion 
deserves greater attention. We argue that access to safe and legal abortion must be a component of 
comprehensive medical genetic services that should sit alongside PND for fetal abnormality. 
There are four components to our analysis. First, we describe the growing availability of PND in Latin 
America and the relevant abortion laws, including a case study around abortion for anencephaly in 
Brazil. Second, we present three ethical problems with the status quo: psychological distress, unjust 
distribution of burdens between socio-economic classes, and the social and financial burdens on 
families and society in caring for ‘unwanted’ children who have serious chronic conditions. We 
recognize the complex political, religious, ethical and socio-economic factors at play in this unusual 
situation and acknowledge that solutions are not straightforward. In the third section we draw on 
Iran as a comparative case study. In Iran, public and religious debate has led to the legalization of 
abortion for fetuses with thalassemia. Finally, we argue for an ethical ‘duty of care’ that physicians, 
geneticists and public policy-makers should adopt towards women and families in this position. 
In making this argument, we recognize that abortion is a contested issue and concede that our 
arguments are unavoidably influenced by our personal views that abortion is an ethically acceptable 
option for women. Indeed, it is difficult to discuss the ethics of PND in the absence of safe and legal 
abortion, without also engaging in discussion of the morality of abortion per se. To this end, we 
focus our argument on the specific issue of the therapeutic gap between the availability of prenatal 
screening and diagnostic services and the presence of restrictive abortion laws, as we believe this 
gives rise to specific ethical issues that should be visible even to those who believe abortion is 
immoral. We shall not engage in debate about the ethics of abortion generally, but we are of the 
opinion that all countries should allow abortion in the case of serious fetal abnormalities. 
Likewise, we recognize that programs of PND are open to critique by scholars promoting a 
perspective informed by the rights and interests of those with disabilities, including those yet to be 
born. It is important to reflect on the goals of PND and to ensure women or couples have the 
opportunity to make a free and informed choice about testing or screening. This paper is, however, 
based on the premise that there are some congenital conditions that are so serious that women or 
couples are not acting unreasonably in deciding to screen for such conditions and to terminate an 
affected pregnancy. 
 
CONTEXT 
This paper explores the ethical issues arising from an unusual and specific context—where PND is 
available but legal abortion for serious congenital abnormalities is not. In order to recognize these 
specific ethical issues, it is necessary to first appreciate the medical and legal particulars of this 
context. 
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Antenatal Screening and Prenatal Diagnosis of Congenital Abnormalities 
Most screening and diagnostic tests in pregnancy are offered during the first 20 weeks of gestation. 
Antenatal screening is used to identify pregnant women carrying fetuses at sufficient risk of a 
congenital disorder to warrant an offer of further investigation. It is generally offered to entire 
populations with a defined set of characteristics, such as advanced maternal age (as this increases 
the risk of chromosomal abnormalities). Antenatal screening techniques include administering 
questionnaires to see if the pregnant woman has a family history of certain conditions or screening 
tests such as maternal serum screening and ultrasound. 
Prenatal diagnosis denotes those diagnostic tests offered by specialized clinical services to couples 
at-risk of giving birth to a child affected by a particular genetic condition or to women who have 
received high-risk results after serum screening or ultrasound. Techniques used in prenatal diagnosis 
include chorionic villus sampling and amniocentesis, which provide samples for subsequent 
karyotyping (examination of whole chromosomes) or DNA analysis. Emerging techniques involve the 
analysis of cell-free fetal DNA or analysis of fetal cells isolated from the maternal bloodstream. 
Prenatal diagnosis is a well-accepted and demanded service in Latin American middle-income 
countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, and is commonly recommended for women over 35 
years of age (Penchaszadeh 2004; Rivera-López 2001). 
One reason for screening and diagnostic testing in pregnancy is to detect the presence of a 
congenital disorder; that is any pathological (or potentially pathological) condition arising before 
birth. This encompasses a wide range of conditions, both inherited and environmentally influenced, 
such as the genetic conditions cystic fibrosis, sickle cell disorder and hemophilia; the chromosomal 
condition Down syndrome; and structural abnormalities such as spina bifida. When demographic 
and epidemiological transition in middle-income countries results in infant mortality falling below 
50/1000 live births, congenital disorders become increasingly visible and begin to account for a 
higher proportion of national morbidity and mortality (Christianson et al. 2004). 
Serious and Untreatable Congenital Conditions 
There are many congenital conditions for which there remain no effective treatments. Tay Sachs 
disease, for example, is an inherited lipid storage disorder that causes progressive damage to tissues 
and nerves in the brain. Infants affected with this condition become blind, deaf, unable to swallow, 
and die in the first few years of life (NINDS 2007a). Anencephaly is another untreatable congenital 
condition, which (contrary to Tay Sachs) does not run in families. Anencephaly is caused by a defect 
in the formation of the neural tube during fetal development, resulting in the absence of a major 
portion of the brain. Babies with this condition are typically stillborn or die within a few hours or 
days of birth (NINDS 2007b). 
In developing countries the range of ‘untreatable’ congenital disorders is significantly larger than in 
the developed world due to limited human and financial resources. This means that conditions 
effectively managed in the developed world can be unmanageable in many developing countries. 
Phenylketonuria (PKU) is an example of this phenomenon. PKU is an inherited error of metabolism 
requiring a special phenylalanine-free diet in early life and during pregnancy in women with PKU 
(Christianson and Modell 2004). Thalassemia is another potentially manageable congenital disorder, 
relatively common in communities where malaria is (or was) endemic, and in immigrant populations 
from these regions, including Latin America. The economic and social cost of thalassemia is high due 
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to patients' lifelong need for monthly blood transfusions and treatment with the iron chelating agent 
desferrioxamine (Perera et al. 2000). Patients receiving treatment often live into their thirties or 
forties, and in high-income countries life expectancy is steadily rising to that of the general 
population (WHO 2006a). The costs of managing thalassemia in developing countries, however, are 
often prohibitively high and many patients do not have access to full treatment. In Iran for example, 
the estimated cost of treating 15,000 thalassemia patients is US$200m per year (Christianson et al. 
2004). 
Termination for Fetal Abnormality 
Some people who undergo prenatal diagnosis choose to continue a pregnancy even if serious fetal 
abnormality is detected (Gadow et al. 2006; Rapp 1999). However, research and experience indicate 
that many women carrying a fetus affected by a serious and ‘untreatable’ congenital disorder prefer 
to terminate the pregnancy. For example, a 1991 study showed that 89 per cent of couples in 
Pakistan known to be carrying a fetus affected with an inherited hemoglobin disorder chose to 
terminate the pregnancy (Ahmed et al. 1991). A survey in Argentina and Uruguay, where abortion on 
the grounds of fetal abnormality is illegal, indicated that 68.2 per cent of couples undergoing 
prenatal diagnosis would contemplate termination of pregnancy in cases of serious congenital 
abnormality (Gadow et al. 2006). A recent retrospective study of 207 cases in Uruguay provides the 
first concrete data from a Latin American country. Of 87 couples who were informed that their fetus 
would develop Down Syndrome, 77 (89 per cent) opted for termination. Of 47 couples informed that 
their fetus carried a chromosomal abnormality with a severe prognosis, 45 (96 per cent) terminated 
the pregnancy (Quadrelli et al. 2007). One Argentinean scholar has indicated that in Latin America 95 
per cent of women who are aware that they are carrying a fetus affected by a congenital disorder 
undergo abortions (Rivera-López 2002). 
Restrictive Abortion Laws and Abortion Rates 
Abortion laws vary from restrictive to liberal, both between and within countries (Boland and 
Katzive, 2008). There are various grounds upon which abortion may be accepted, including 
pregnancies resulting from rape, those that pose a significant threat to the health of the mother or 
unwanted pregnancies. Table 1 demonstrates the proportion of developed and developing countries 
that permit abortion for fetal abnormality. In developed regions, 81 per cent of countries allow 
abortions for fetal impairment, whereas in less developed regions only 26 per cent allow abortions 
on these grounds. 
Table 1 Legal permissibility of abortion of fetal impairment by region*  
 
Abortion law throughout most of Latin America and the Caribbean is highly restrictive. In Chile, El 
Savlador and Nicaragua, for example, abortion is prohibited (Taucher 2004; Replogle 2007; Boland 
and Katzive, 2008). Exceptions to this general rule include Cuba, Colombia, Ecuador, and some in-
country jurisdictions such as Mexico City (and several other Mexican states), where abortion laws 
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are more liberal (Penchaszadeh 2004; Boland and Katzive, 2008). Throughout Latin America, many 
governments and legislators have publicly linked their opposition to birth control methods with 
Catholic doctrine and the Catholic Church has proved inflexible in debates about contraception and 
abortion (Human Rights Watch 2005). Cook and Dickens argue that the rigidity of Catholic moral 
doctrine was entrenched by the 1870 adoption of the concept of papal infallibility in 
pronouncements made ex cathedra. As a result, no new revelations can be accepted unless they are 
demonstrated to be consistent with earlier rulings and there is no room for reversing or overruling 
existing policies on the basis that they were erroneous (Cook and Dickens 2002). However we also 
recognize that in some jurisdictions apparently restrictive laws may be interpreted or applied more 
liberally in practice, while in other countries apparently liberal laws have limited practical use due to 
difficulties in accessing an abortion provider (Boland and Katzive, 2008). 
Under the Argentinean penal code, abortion for genetic reasons is a crime (except for the City of 
Buenos Aires, which passed a law in 2003 allowing abortion after six months of pregnancy for 
anencephaly (Luna 2007)). There are provisions for waiving the penalties associated with abortion if 
the life or health of the pregnant woman is in danger or if the pregnancy results from the rape of a 
mentally disabled woman. The interpretation of these exceptions is controversial; it could be argued 
that this exception be read so as to allow abortion in either the case of rape or mental incapacity of 
the mother. In practice, it is difficult for women who fulfill both the narrow and broad 
interpretations to access safe and legal abortion because there are no clear policies regulating 
access. Physicians and hospitals are often reluctant to perform non-prohibited abortions due to the 
apparent legal ambiguity and may seek explicit judicial authorization for any abortions. However, 
judges have previously refused to rule on these cases on the grounds that the penal code lays out 
the legal exceptions and therefore there is no interpretative role for the courts to play. Women 
requesting a lawful abortion can be caught between their physicians and the judicial process (Luna 
2004). 
Some courts in Latin America have allowed abortions in cases where the fetus suffers from severe 
abnormalities ‘incompatible’ with survival outside the womb, but again this is approved on an ad-
hoc basis and women in general do not have an assured legal right to such services (Horovitz et al. 
2004). This status quo of the availability of prenatal diagnosis without access to safe abortion also 
appears to go against a recommendation from the International Federation of Gynecology and 
Obstetrics: 
In countries where it is an accepted medical practice, whenever a severe untreatable fetal disease or 
malformation, incompatible with a normal life, is diagnosed by prenatal diagnosis, termination of 
pregnancy must be offered to the parents (Milliez, 2008, p 98). 
Unsafe Abortion 
It is widely acknowledged that restrictive abortion laws do little to change the overall rate of induced 
abortions; rather they increase the proportion of unsafe abortion (Rivera-López 2002). The World 
Health Organization (WHO) defines unsafe abortion as induced abortions carried out by persons 
lacking the necessary skills and/or carried out in an environment that does not conform to minimal 
medical and safety standards (WHO 2004). Fathalla, an obstetrician with extensive international 
experience, argues: 
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In this situation [where rates of unwanted pregnancies are high], restricting access to abortions will 
only increase the number of illegal and unsafe abortions. The choice will not be between allowing or 
preventing abortion. It will be between decriminalizing abortion or allowing it only to be performed 
as an illegal procedure (Fathalla 1997, 238). 
Because abortion laws are typically more restrictive in the developing world, women in developing 
countries are more likely to have illegal abortions than women in developed countries (WHO 2004). 
Thirteen percent of all maternal deaths worldwide are thought to be due to unsafe abortion—
equating to 68,000 maternal deaths per year (WHO 2004). 1 In Latin America, for example, 4.5 
million abortions are carried out every year. Ninety-five per cent of these are illegal and account for 
25 per cent of maternal mortality in Latin America (Penchaszadeh 2004). It is estimated that more 
than half a million women in Argentina undergo illegal (and typically unsafe) abortions every year, 
representing 40 per cent of all pregnancies (Human Rights Watch 2005). In addition to mortality 
there is significant morbidity. Unsafe abortion carries a risk of many other common yet avoidable 
health risks, including sepsis, anemia (following hemorrhage), pelvic infection, genital trauma (such 
as vaginal wall laceration), cervical tears and uterine perforation, injury to the bowel, and 
vesicovaginal fistulae (Anate et al. 1995). 
Brazil: A Case Study 
In Brazil, the combination of accessible PND and restrictive abortion legislation leads to the 
predictable and difficult situation where women are informed of a fetal abnormality but do not have 
the option to safely and legally terminate the pregnancy (Guilam and Corrêa 2007). According to the 
law, abortion is prohibited except in instances of rape (Boland and Katzive 2008). 2 Medical genetic 
services are well-developed in wealthy regions of the country, and both public and private sector 
health professionals offer services aimed at detecting monogenic and chromosomal conditions 
(Marques-de-Faria et al. 2004). Yet, under Brazil's penal code, termination is only permitted where 
the pregnancy is the result of rape or will endanger the life of the mother (Brazilian Penal Code 1940, 
amended 1998). While there is no legal provision for termination for fetal abnormality, it is 
estimated that between 1989 and 2004, Brazilian courts authorized approximately 3,000 abortions 
for conditions deemed incompatible with life outside the womb (Gollop and Pimentel 2004, cited by 
Diniz 2007). 
In 2004, Brazilian bioethicist Deborah Diniz directed an award-winning documentary telling the story 
of a couple whose fetus was diagnosed with anencephaly at four months, but who were not able to 
procure a legal abortion until the pregnancy was in its seventh month due to ongoing debate 
concerning the morality and legality of abortion for anencephalic fetuses in Brazil's Supreme Federal 
Tribunal (Diniz and Brum 2005; Diniz 2007). Judicial attitudes in Brazil are inconsistent: some judges 
permit abortions of anencephalic babies, yet others routinely reject them. In this case, by the time 
judicial permission for the abortion was granted, the fetus had to be delivered vaginally and the 
mother endured a 32-hour delivery. Despite court permission for the abortion, the anesthesiologists 
on duty at the hospital refused to provide pain relief, on the grounds of personal conscientious 
objection to the abortion. 
This status quo is contentious both within and outside Brazil. In a statement to the Supreme Federal 
Tribunal during the above case, the Brazilian Human Rights, Gender and Bioethics Institute argued 
that the failure to consistently permit abortion in cases of anencephaly results in physical and 
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psychological torture and denies women their constitutional right to access health care 
(KaiserNetwork 2004). 
 
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Screening for and diagnosis of congenital abnormality in pregnancy, with subsequent access to 
termination, is readily available in the developed world. As middle-income and developing countries 
are now offering screening and diagnostic services in pregnancy, we submit that these are 
incomplete if women are forced to choose between having a child with a serious congenital 
condition or risking an unsafe and illegal abortion. We recognize that not all termination requests in 
cases of fetal abnormality are alike, and those for some conditions (deafness, cleft palate or 
achondroplasia, for example) are more contentious than others. However, some serious congenital 
disorders lead to a very low quality of life or are incompatible with life altogether, and it is these 
conditions that are the primary focus of this paper. We have identified three types of harm that arise 
from allowing PND for these conditions in the absence of safe and legal abortion. 
Psychological Harm 
First, being effectively forced to continue an unwanted and sometimes futile pregnancy can cause 
psychological trauma or harm to affected women. In most cases of congenital abnormality, the 
pregnancy is planned and wanted and the discovery of a fetal abnormality is traumatic. Effectively 
forcing women to continue with a pregnancy in these circumstances can exacerbate and extend 
what can already be a sad and painful process, delaying the point of closure. Given the later 
gestation at which many abnormalities are diagnosed, women who continue with a pregnancy often 
need go through full vaginal labor, a process that is physically more dangerous and emotionally more 
distressing than a second trimester abortion. In cases of severe congenital abnormalities, the 
pregnancy must be endured with the knowledge that the child will not survive or will survive for only 
a few years with potentially very low quality of life. 
An associated harm is the disempowerment of women in the process of reproduction. Medical 
genetic technologies are introduced as a component of reproductive care; however, throughout 
most of Latin America these services provide knowledge to women but fail to provide acceptable 
management options that meet the needs of affected women. Women who wish to abort the fetus 
but who do not have access to safe services are faced with the choice of exposing their own bodies 
to harm through unsafe abortion or of exposing their child to suffering in the future if the pregnancy 
continues to term. It seems likely that this medico-legal context leaves affected women feeling 
powerless during their own pregnancies. 
Social Justice 
Second, this situation raises issues of social justice and equity. Even in countries where abortion for 
fetal abnormality is illegal, affluent sectors of the community can often afford to pay for a safe but 
illegal abortion within the country or for travel to procure a safe legal abortion in another 
jurisdiction. Horovitz et al argue that, in Brazil: 
Those who can afford to pay for a safe abortion usually choose to terminate the affected pregnancy 
with no health or legal consequences. On the other hand, for most couples the option is between 
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continuation of an affected pregnancy against their will, or an illegal and unsafe abortion, with its 
risks of social ostracism, prison, health damage, and even death. (Horovitz et al. 2004, 114–5) 
The burden of unsafe abortion falls disproportionately on poor women, who are restricted to local 
clinics or precarious “at home” methods. The quality of service provided in illegal abortion clinics, by 
definition, is not subject to government regulation and women are often charged additional fees for 
antibiotics and anesthetic. Poor women who cannot afford these ‘extras’ are exposed to greater pain 
and risk of infection. The choice faced by poorer women, between continuing with a pregnancy 
against their will or an illegal and unsafe abortion, is unacceptable when the standards for ensuring 
safe abortions are simple and well established (WHO 2003). 
Unequal access to safe abortion according to socio-economic class unfairly restricts poor women's 
procreative autonomy—their “right to control their own role in procreation unless the state has a 
compelling reason for denying them that control” (Dworkin 1993, 148). The legal foundations for 
women's reproductive rights are built upon a variety of human rights recognized under international 
law (Center for Reproductive Rights 2003). Women denied safe abortion for fetal abnormality in 
developing countries are deprived of an element of control in their reproductive life that is readily 
available elsewhere in the world, and to the wealthy sectors of their own community. 
Socio-Economic Burdens 
Third, it is widely accepted that raising any child with a congenital disorder places an additional 
financial and emotional strain on couples and health systems, and ‘unwanted’ children are no 
exception. Providing health care and support for children affected by genetic and congenital 
conditions places further demands on already scarce health resources. In the absence of 
comprehensive public health systems, the burden of care falls on families, particularly mothers. 
Again, it is likely to be families that can least afford this financial burden that are most likely to be 
faced with it, as they are unlikely to have been able to afford a safe abortion. Women who are 
already struggling financially will be particularly displaced by having to raise a child they had no 
choice but to give birth to. By contrast, access to safe abortion in cases of severe fetal abnormality, 
and the chance to establish a subsequent ‘healthy’ pregnancy if desired, may protect these groups 
from becoming increasingly marginalized. 
In addition, the birth of ‘unwanted’ children with severe congenital abnormalities places further 
strain on already over-burdened public health systems in developing and middle-income countries. 
WHO consultants have argued that optimum reproductive counseling can take place only in the 
context of available and affordable contraception and abortion for congenital disorders, and 
available and affordable resources for caring for persons with disabilities (WHO 2001). Abortion for 
fetal abnormality is thus an important aspect of a comprehensive service to detect and manage 
congenital disorders. Research indicates that a large proportion of parents faced with the news that 
their fetus is affected with a severe abnormality choose to terminate the pregnancy (Ahmed et al. 
1991). The subsequent reduction in the birth rate of children affected with congenital disorders will 
free up financial and health resources for the provision of a higher level of care for those children 
who are born with such conditions. 
In making these points, we are not arguing that the socio-economic burden associated with 
congenital abnormalities is such that it would warrant all affected pregnancies being terminated. 
Such a policy would be eugenic and an invasion of women's reproductive autonomy. Access to 
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voluntary, safe and legal terminations and public resources for the care of children and persons with 
disabilities should sit side by side. Denying women terminations for fetal abnormality places an 
avoidable and unnecessary strain on limited health resources. The availability of safe and legal 
abortion for fetal abnormality therefore supports the decision of parents who wish to terminate and 
those who wish to continue with the pregnancy. 
Responses 
Some supporters of the current system might respond that antenatal screening and prenatal 
diagnosis can provide a beneficial service for some pregnant women, irrespective of the availability 
of legal and safe abortion services. The provision of screening and diagnosis, when accompanied by 
appropriate counseling, can help families, particularly women, prepare for the birth of an affected 
child (El-Shanti 2001). Further, some congenital disorders can present challenges and risks during 
delivery and prior knowledge will allow the birth attendants to prepare for this occurrence in 
advance. As such, prenatal services can be beneficial for those women and families who would 
choose to continue with the pregnancy even when a congenital disorder has been identified. 
We do not dispute this assertion—indeed we endorse it. The availability of abortion for congenital 
disorders should not preclude women from continuing with affected pregnancies. Quite the 
opposite is true—the choice to terminate a pregnancy should always be an informed and voluntary 
choice of a pregnant woman. All decisions to undergo screening and any subsequent termination 
must be appropriately informed (with access to unbiased information) and made in the absence of 
undue influence from health professionals or others. The availability of legal and safe selective 
abortion for affected pregnancies would remove the burden placed on women who do not wish to 
continue with the pregnancy, while allowing women who do wish to continue to plan for the birth 
and subsequent care of the child. The full utility of prenatal services is restricted if legal abortion for 
affected pregnancies is not available, because women who would use this advanced warning to 
terminate a pregnancy are not permitted to do so (Aguiar 2004). 
We submit that in Latin America, the prohibition on abortion for fetal abnormality has remained in 
place (despite the increase in prenatal genetic testing and some narrow jurisdictional exceptions) in 
part because well-educated women with financial means and influence are comparatively 
unaffected by the prohibition. Wealthy women can typically afford to procure safe (if illegal) 
abortions in private clinics or can travel to jurisdictions where abortion is legal. Therefore women 
with the greatest capacity to argue against these laws are least affected by them; whereas the 
women most affected by the laws have the least capacity to affect legislative reform. It is manifestly 
unjust that women with socio-economic resources may express their reproductive autonomy while 
poor women bear the burden of the current policies. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD: DRAWING ON THE EXPERIENCE IN IRAN 
Recent experience in Iran demonstrates that religious objections to abortion are not necessarily 
intractable in the face of new scientific developments such as prenatal genetic testing. 
Thalassemia is a recessive genetic disease that represents a significant health burden in Iran, with 
around 8,000 at-risk pregnancies and 2,000 affected fetuses per year (Ghotbi 2002). A premarital 
screening program to identify carrier couples was initiated in Iran in 1996, and a summary of the 
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program from 1997–2001 showed that on average 53 per cent of carrier couples still chose to marry 
despite the risk (Samavat and Modell 2004). Abortion for thalassemia was not available when the 
screening program began (Larijani and Anaraki 2008). But at-risk couples soon demanded access to 
prenatal diagnosis and the option of selective abortion of affected fetuses. This increased demand 
for abortion in the case of fetal impairment sparked debate among the public, religious leaders, and 
policy makers. 
Following extensive public debate in Iran, religious scholars endorsed a threshold for termination of 
affected fetuses under 16 weeks (Hedayat et al. 2006; Aramesh 2007; Al Aqeel 2007). The Iranian 
prohibition on abortion was subsequently amended in 2001 to permit early selective termination of 
fetuses with thalassemia (Christianson et al. 2004). In 2005 the Iranian parliament ratified the 
Therapeutic Abortion Act which permits abortions in the first four months if the fetus has a mental 
or physical impairment or the mother's life is in danger (Larijani and Zahedi 2006). The Legal 
Medicine Organization has defined 51 fetal and maternal health conditions for which abortion would 
be permitted. 
Iran is a predominantly Shiite Muslim country, with a legal system founded in Shiite Islamic law or 
shari'a. A democratically elected unicameral legislative body, the Majlis-e Shura, drafts laws which 
are then checked for consistency with contemporary religious ruling by the Guardian Council (a body 
comprised of six religious jurists selected by the supreme religious leader and six lawyers selected by 
the parliament) (Hedayat et al 2006; Aramesh 2007). Hedayat et al suggest that religious support for 
the new abortion law was motivated in part by recognition of the fact that 80,000 illegal abortions 
occur annually in Iran, and the financial hardship experienced by poor families coping with long-term 
serious congenital abnormalities (Hedayat et al). 
The Iranian case demonstrates that the introduction of reproductive genetic services can increase 
demand for greater access to selective abortion, leading to the liberalization of abortion law in cases 
of fetal abnormality. A comprehensive nationally coordinated program of medical genetic services 
must consider the relationship between prenatal screening and testing, the legality of abortion, and 
the risks to women as a result of unsafe abortion (WHO 2006b). The failure to provide for legal, safe, 
accessible abortions for fetal abnormalities exposes women to serious but avoidable physical, legal, 
social, emotional and financial harm. A key aspect of the Iranian experience was the holistic 
engagement of affected families, epidemiologists, geneticists, religious scholars and broader society 
in public dialogue (WHO 2006b; Aramesh 2007). 
 
AN ETHICAL ‘DUTY OF CARE’ TO FACILITATE SAFE ABORTION? 
As unsafe and illegal abortion will harm women carrying fetuses with a congenital disorder, an 
obligation exists to minimize the degree of harm. A duty of care therefore arises for geneticists, 
physicians and health policy advisors and to address this situation. 
Physicians have a duty of care to provide appropriate post-abortion care. However, research has 
demonstrated that it is common for women presenting at public hospitals in Argentina, who are 
hemorrhaging or suffering from life-threatening infections or injuries caused by unsafe abortions, to 
be denied appropriate care. This can range from verbal abuse from medical professionals, to refusal 
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to use anesthetic during post-abortion curettage, to failure to provide care at all (Human Rights 
Watch 2005): 
A woman [we work with] went to the hospital in a very bad state with an abortion and she was 
infected and hemorrhaging. A doctor started to examine her, and when he started to see her and 
realized, he threw down his instruments on the floor. He said: “This is an abortion, you go ahead and 
die!”—Social worker, Santa Fe Province (Human Rights Watch 2005, 2) 
In 2007, it was reported that public policy in El Salvador was to require doctors by law to notify the 
police if they suspect that a woman has undergone an abortion, although it was unclear whether this 
obligation was overridden by the medical duty of confidentiality (Hitt 2007). The emotional and 
physical abuse of patients at the hands of physicians is unacceptable in any circumstances. While 
health professionals are entitled to personal views about the morality of abortion, they have a 
professional duty of care to provide appropriate treatment for patients, including post-abortion 
patients, in their care. 
Drawing on the experience in Iran, although we acknowledge there are differences between Islam 
and Catholicism, we argue that policy-makers throughout Latin America should initiate and support 
dialogue between affected families, relevant medical specialists and religious leaders in order to 
ensure that reproductive services, including prenatal screening and selective abortion, are 
implemented in a manner that maximizes the health benefit to patients and families. 
Geneticists who provide PND see first-hand the emotional trauma and difficult moral decisions faced 
by affected women and families. Medical geneticists have a professional and ethical obligation to 
engage in this debate—to assist in educating the public, legislators and physicians about the medical 
features of congenital abnormalities that are being screened for, the quality of life of affected 
children, and difficult decisions faced by parents in these circumstances. 
We have noted that women most affected by this situation are typically socially disadvantaged and 
poorly positioned to initiate dialogue and affect legislative change alone. It is therefore incumbent 
on the professionals who are responsible for introducing and administering new genetic 
technologies to use their positions to draw attention to the inequity and harm associated with the 
current policies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The ethical status of abortion will remain controversial for the foreseeable future. Our primary 
concern in this paper has been to highlight the specific ethical issues associated with the provision of 
PND without legislative protection to safe abortions in cases of congenital abnormality. PND cannot 
be treated as morally neutral technology. These services must be considered within the broader 
medico-legal context in which they are offered. We have argued that the sociological and ethical 
consequences of introducing this technology in countries with restrictive abortion laws deserve 
greater attention. 
Offering prenatal diagnosis in a situation where abortion is unlawful places women (and their 
partners) in a situation of moral hazard. To offer a service, typically on a fee-for-service basis, where 
abortion is a spoken or unspoken possibility in case of detection of an abnormality, and where this 
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would be unlawful, places many poor women in the position of making an unjust choice: a choice 
between continuing with a pregnancy they do not want and cannot afford on the one hand, or 
exposing themselves to the legal, financial, social, emotional and physical risks of an unsafe abortion 
on the other hand. It is unjust to allow those who already enjoy socio-economic advantages to safely 
terminate affected pregnancies whilst letting the burden of unsafe abortion and/or the birth of 
children with congenital abnormalities fall in the lap of poor patients. The status quo may be 
comfortable for those with the financial resources to access safe abortion but it is morally 
unacceptable. 
Data from Latin America indicates that more than 80 percent of women and couples who know their 
fetus is affected with a serious congenital abnormality choose to terminate the pregnancy. It is 
hypocritical to turn a blind eye to the fact that wealthy women may exercise their reproductive 
autonomy whilst denying poor women access to safe abortion services. Safe and legal abortion for 
serious congenital abnormalities must be a component of comprehensive medical genetic services 
that should sit alongside PND for fetal abnormality, and public resources for caring for children and 
persons affected with a disability. It is questionable medical ethics to report women to the police 
even where an illegal abortion has occurred or been attempted. Those who are responsible for 
introducing the technology and those who witness its implementation—geneticists, physicians, 
policy makers—should use their voices to represent the plight of poor women faced with the unjust 
choice between unsafe abortion and raising a child with a serious congenital abnormality for whom 
they do not believe they can provide appropriate care. 
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Notes 
1. Note that worldwide data regarding abortion rates are notoriously incomplete. Due to the fact 
that induced abortion is restricted or illegal in many countries and many resource-poor countries 
lack the infrastructure for collecting data, global statistics regarding the prevalence of abortion, 
including unsafe and illegal abortion, can be estimated only indirectly. World Health Organization 
(2004) Unsafe abortion: global and regional estimates of incidence of unsafe abortion and associated 
mortality in 2000. World health Organization: Geneva. 
2. In one of this paper's author's (FL) experience, it has been suggested that abortion for fetal 
abnormality would be acceptable in Brazil according to jurisprudential analysis, but that there is a 
serious lack of providers. 
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_____________________________ 
 
Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Prenatal Diagnosis and 
Abortion for Congenital Abnormalities: Is It Ethical to Provide One 
Without the Other?” 
Ballantyne, A. Newson, A.J., Luna, F. Ashcroft, R. (2009) 
We thank all the commentators to our paper, but here limit our remarks to those that directly 
challenge our argument. We have critiqued an unusual policy context in which prenatal diagnosis 
(PND) for congenital abnormalities is available, but therapeutic abortion is not. We accept there are 
two potential solutions to this dilemma: (i) Removing PND services; or (ii) liberalizing abortion laws 
to allow abortion for fetal abnormality. For additional reasons, however, improved access to 
abortion is a preferable response to this problem. First, as several commentators noted, the 
rationale for PND is not always to procure an abortion (Kon 2009; Sperling 2009; Zivotofsky & 
Jotkowitz 2009). Second, women of means may simply travel elsewhere to access PND, just as they 
can travel now to obtain safe abortion of pregnancy. This would further entrench socio-economic 
inequalities in access to healthcare. Third, the removal of PND in countries with restrictive abortion 
laws would further increase the healthcare gap between developed and developing countries. 
Fourth, it is unusual for health interventions to be withdrawn after the public has accepted them as 
standard component of their healthcare, at least where they are safe and clinically effective. 
Therefore the current situation should be resolved by liberalizing abortion laws rather than 
removing access to PND. 
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Buccafurni and Chang (2009) interpret our argument as being motivated by cost-management. This 
is not our intention. Our argument is primarily motivated by women's reproductive freedom and the 
minimization of harm from the introduction of PND. We point out that allowing women and couples 
the option of aborting fetuses affected by a severe congenital abnormality could free healthcare 
resources to provide a better level of care for those families that are caring for an impaired child. We 
share their concern that this level of care is currently inadequate. Providing a socio-economic 
analysis of further marginalization was beyond the scope of our paper but it seems reasonable to 
claim that if an already poor family effectively has no choice but to have a child with a severe 
disability (who will require health intervention without adequate state support) then they will be 
worse off. 
Sperling (2009) argues that our focus on legalizing abortion is misguided; that we assume the law is 
an impediment to people deciding whether to abort in cases of fetal abnormality when in fact this is 
not a salient factor. This critique misinterprets our argument. The law can limit access to safe 
abortion, but is rarely a determining factor for whether women do decide to abort. In fact we said 
that prohibition rarely leads to a reduction in abortion rates. We also disagree with Sperling's final 
claim that the status quo is acceptable because the benefits of access to PND without abortion 
outweigh the harms we have described. The psychological, financial and safety implications of the 
status quo suggest to us that this is incorrect. 
Two commentators question whether our analysis is underpinned by assumptions about the lesser 
moral worth of fetuses with congenital abnormalities (Wasserman & Asch 2009; Buccafurni & Chang 
2009). Buccafurni and Chang additionally hypothesize that despite accepting abortion for fetal 
abnormalities, we would not accept abortion for social sex selection. This appears to imply that sex 
does not confer lesser moral status, while impairment does. 
Our argument does not carry the intention to eliminate disability, but to offer women full 
reproductive choice through having access to a range of interventions post-PND should they choose 
it. Admittedly, this may imply that it is worse to prevent abortions in the case of fetal anomaly than 
other circumstances; but this is because the hardships faced by women are likely to be greater, not 
because the fetus has lesser moral worth. 
Wasserman and Asch (2009) also note that we have not shown that it is more harmful to raise a 
baby with impairment than an unplanned but non-disabled baby. Although we have not provided 
comparative evidence for this claim, we do assert that raising a child with a severe impairment in 
low-resourced middle- or low- income countries is likely to place greater strain on families than will 
raising an unwanted but non-disabled child. While this is not a necessary truth, in most such 
societies not only are “disablist” attitudes prevalent, support services, welfare payments, and 
impairment-minimizing environments are currently lacking or underfunded. To explain a wish not to 
assume this higher burden as implying disablist attitudes is to discount the moral salience of the 
prevailing material and structural conditions. 
This response does not entirely overcome Wasserman and Asch's critique of our position, however, 
since much the same can be said about sex selection in sexist or misogynist societies. We do agree 
that abortion on the grounds of fetal sex is prima facie wrong where it involves injustice to women. 
There is however a difference between these two grounds for abortion (severe impairment, sex): in 
the former there is an implication that severe impairment will have significant medical and social 
implications for the baby, the parent(s), and public health; whereas even in the most sexist societies 
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it is not the case that having a daughter is medically problematic. In an anti-disablist society these 
may be equivalent. But in current society medical and public health perspectives are that, other 
things being equal, disability is something that couples should be able to choose to prevent. 
On the other hand, social scientists have shown that PND may not only be interpreted clinically to 
detect abnormality but also culturally to reinforce that a first or second trimester fetus is a ‘baby,’ 
thus constructing the pregnant woman as already a mother, and the fetus as already having a 
personality and rights, reinforcing the notion of maternal responsibility over reproductive autonomy. 
We suggest that rather than PND without access to abortion being an unqualified benefit to 
pregnant women, it in fact constructs them more firmly in accordance with the prevailing cultural 
and social norms of motherhood. This is a delicate argument; but its essence is that it matters 
morally who offers PND, why they offer it, and what options it leads to; and that there is a morally 
relevant difference between PND initiated by doctors in connection with health promotion 
(medically conceived) and PND initiated by women in connection with sex for social reasons. How far 
that escapes Wasserman and Asch's powerful challenge is something we will have to take up on 
another occasion. 
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